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ABSTRACT
THE INFLATION TAX AND PERIOD LENGTH IN
CASH-IN-ADVANCE MODELS
Çubuk, Bedriye
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assist. Prof.  Neil Arnwine
July 2002
The aim of this study is to focus on the frequency with which consumers
conduct financial transactions, and the role that this plays in the determination of the
money velocity, price level, transactions cost and consequently determination of
welfare cost of inflation. We introduce a CIA model with a Baumol-Tobin
transactions mechanism. This provides a contribution to the CIA literature by
allowing the transactions period to be endogenous and contributes to the Baumol-
Tobin model by placing the decision rules in a general equilibrium setting. We find
that the transactions period length is an integral part of the behavior of the monetary
economy.
Keywords:  Cash-in-advance Models, Transactions Cost, Velocity of Money,
Welfare Cost of Inflation
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ÖZET
ENFLASYON VERGİSİ VE NAKİT KISITLARININ OLDUĞU BİR
EKONOMİDE PERİYOT UZUNLUĞU
Çubuk, Bedriye
Master, Ekonomi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Y. Doç. Dr. Neil Arnwine
Temmuz 2002
 Bu  çalışmanın amacı, tüketicilerin finansal işlem yapma sıklığını incelemek
ve bu sıklığın paranın dolaşım hızı, fiyat düzeyi, işlem maliyeti ve sonrasında
enflasyonun refah düzeyi üzerindeki etkilerini incelemektir. Baumol-Tobin işlem
mekanizması olan, satınalmalarda nakit kısıtlarının bulunduğu bir model geliştirdik.
Bu model, işlem periyodunda değişime izin vererek nakit kısıtlarının olduğu
modellere, genel denge içerisinde karar verme özelliğiyle de Baumol-Tobin
modellerine katkıda bulunmuştur. İşlem periyot uzunluğunun parasal ekonomide
önemli bir yer aldığını gözlemledik.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Nakit Kısıtlı Modeller, İşlem Maliyeti, Paranın Dolaşım Hızı,
Enflasyonun Refaha Etkisi.
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11 INTRODUCTION
In typical cash-in-advance (CIA) models, the transactions period length is
considered to be fixed and exogenously determined. In empirical work this
assumption is strengthened by fixing the period length to be consistent with the
frequency of data collection. We relax this restriction by allowing the consumer to
jointly choose the initial money stock and frequency of transactions just like Baumol
(1952)-Tobin (1956) to satisfy the CIA constraint.
We introduce a flexible transactions technology into the standard CIA model
of money demand. With this innovation1, we generalize the determination of the
velocity of money in the general equilibrium CIA model. The consumer balances the
opportunity cost of holding money with the cost of transacting τ * n where τ is the
marginal cost (possibly “shoe-leather”) of transacting and n is the number of trips to
the bank.
In the first CIA model introduced by Lucas (1980), consumers learn the state
of the economy before they trade assets and money, so they hold exactly enough
money to facilitate their purchases, hence the velocity of money is forced to be unity.
Several works have tried to relax this result. Lucas (1980) and Svensson (1985) relax
this result by introducing uncertainty into the model. In these models, money
balances are selected before the state of the world is known. In Lucas (1980) there is
                                                
1 This innovation is first described in Arnwine (2000)
2uncertainty about demand for consumption good, in Svensson (1985) there is
uncertainty about money growth, and therefore about the price level. In these models
it is possible for the CIA constraint to be slack in some periods, so the velocity may
vary below unity. Lucas and Stokey (1987) introduced a model with “cash” and
“credit” goods. This innovation in the model allows the velocity of money to vary
above unity because total purchases may be greater than money balances.
The literature on money velocity is not new. Baumol (1952) analyzed the
transactions demand for cash for the rational consumer who wants to balance the
opportunity cost of holding money, foregone interest, with the cost of obtaining new
money balances via costly transactions. He focused on a steady state environment
where precautionary and speculative demands have no place. Using Baumol’s
notation, the consumer has to pay out T amount of cash in a determined period of
time. He has to minimize on the sum of broker’s fees and the opportunity cost of
holding cash. Baumol derived the square root formula for demand for cash to be C =
(2*b*T/i)1/2 , where C is the withdrawal amount, b is the “brokerage fee”, T is the
total payment, and i is the interest rate. Given the price level, the demand for cash is
proportional to the square root of the value of the transactions. The Baumol model
depicts the non-coincidence of discrete cash receipts and payments which occur in a
steady stream. In a similar model, Tobin (1956) found that
        “…the failure of receipts and expenditures to be perfectly synchronized
           certainly creates the need for transactions balances.” (page 241)
3In his case the transactions fee consists of two, namely, constant and variable
parts. The problem he encounters is to find the relationship between the average
bond holding and the interest rate, where cash and bond holding are the choice
variables, to maximize the after transactions cost interest revenue.
Rodriguez (1998) inserts Baumol and Tobin’s setup into a general
equilibrium CIA model where the velocity of money is calculated within the model.
In his model, the consumer economizes on his cash holdings by altering the number
of trips to the bank with the changing inflation. Except from the first transaction,
there is a fixed cost of transacting. The consumer chooses his bond holdings and the
amount of the withdrawal for the succeeding period. A precautionary demand for
money is obtained and the variability of velocity above unity is achieved. In his
paper, Rodriguez concludes that the results of the deterministic models are very close
to the stochastic ones.
Corbae (1993) allows variation in velocity by allowing consumers to relax the
CIA constraint by incurring a fixed transactions cost. As it is usual in CIA models,
the transactions period is exogenously determined so there is not a true trade-off
between holding money balances and transacting as in Baumol-Tobin model.
The empirical performance of the CIA models is linked to the data period.
The data frequency is generally predetermined to be a quarter, which implicitly
imposes that the consumer’s cash holding will last for 13 weeks. Giovaninni and
Labadie (1991) examine the performance of the CIA models find that for a number
of parameter combinations the CIA constraint always binds and allows no variations
4in the velocity. We assert that this results from the assumption that the finance period
was assumed to be exogenous and fixed. Hodrick, Kocherlakota, Lucas (1991) also
explore whether the mentioned models can produce realistic predictions. They find
that in the cash-only model, the predicted velocity of money is always constant and
unitary. In the cash-credit model, velocity varies as agents can substitute between
cash and credit goods. Using a model with Svensson’s timing assumption, their
model could not satisfactorily explain the observed variability of velocity.
Other empirical work using the CIA model has shown the deficiency in the
model. Cooley and Hansen (1989) simulated a CIA model which is calibrated for
both quarterly and monthly data, which includes leisure and investment decisions for
studying the welfare costs of inflation. In the monthly case the welfare cost of
inflation predicted by the model is significantly lower than in the quarterly case. This
again points out the existence of a problem in the concept of transactions period
length in CIA models. Their result is to be expected. For a given stock of money, a
CIA constraint placed upon a quarter’s purchases should bind much stricter than a
CIA constraint placed upon a month’s purchases. Therefore the predicted utility cost
of inflation is higher in the quarterly model. This is a case of model failure.
 In Cooley and Hansen (1989) the only way that consumers can reduce the
cash holdings in response to the high inflation is to reduce consumption, which
increases consumption of other goods, leisure and investment. In a latter work,
Cooley and Hansen(1991) introduce a production economy utilizing Lucas and
Stokey’s cash credit model with Svensson’s timing convention. In this study, Cooley
5and Hansen compare the welfare cost of income and capital taxes with those of an
inflation tax. Quoting from the paper:
" Choosing a measure of money presents problems. Conventional 
monetary aggregates that one might use to capture quantities subject to 
the inflation tax- the monetary base, or the non-interest bearing portion 
of M1- have the drawback that they are too large. They imply velocities 
less than unity which is inconsistent with the model. Instead, we use the 
portion of M1 that is held by households." (page 492)
When new data series must be constructed to confirm to the model, there is a
problem with the model.
In this work, we endogenize the transactions decision. We mainly follow
Cooley and Hansen (1991) for comparison purposes. After calibrating the model to
match observed velocity we replicated Cooley and Hansen’s (1991) “inflation tax
only” model. We find the velocity of money is determined within the model and can
vary in response to the high inflation. Our results2 show that the velocity can take
values both below and above unity within the same model. This result has not been
shown before.
The work is organized as follows; Chapter II introduces the model, Chapter
III describes how the model is calibrated and solved numerically, Chapter VI
explains the Friedman Rule which is the benchmark case for comparing the welfare
                                                
2 See results for model calibrated to fit M2 data, Table 2 column n.
6effects of inflation on the economy. Chapter V presents the results. Chapter VI
concludes.
72. THE MODEL
        We study an economy which consists of a representative competitive firm,
which rents capital and hires labor to produce output using a Cobb-Douglas
production technology. The model used will be the same as that examined in Cooley
and Hansen (1991) with the innovation of period length in the cash-in-advance
constraint. In this study, we concentrate on the properties of the steady-state, non-
stochastic, equilibrium.
2.1 Equilibrium Concept
        In this model the firm produces output and facilitates costly transactions for the
consumer. Both functions are conducted on a competitive basis. During a transaction
the firm provides the consumer with cash. Between transactions cash flows from the
consumer to the firm as the consumer purchases the cash good.
        The transactions fee can be considered as the cost of confirming that the
consumer’s budget constraint can support the cash withdrawal and recording the
transaction. The existence of such a cost motivates the existence of a cash based
transactions mechanism.
        The fee may also include “shoe-leather” cost on the part of the consumer.
82.2 The Government
        The sole role of government in this economy is to supply money. Money is
supplied to the economy via lump sum transfers, or tax, of ( ) MgMMTR ⋅−=−′= 1 ,
where g is the growth rate of money balances3.
2.3 Consumer Constraints
        The cash-credit good model of Lucas and Stokey (1987) is adopted. The model
does not include any uncertainty and all markets are competitive. The representative
consumer maximizes the utility function; U (c1, c2, h) given in equation 1.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) hhU cccc ⋅γ−α−+α= 2121 log1log,,                                                           (1)
Here, c1 is the consumption of “cash good” and c2 is the consumption of “credit
good”, α is the relative weight given to the consumption of the cash good in the
utility function.  Labor hours, h, enter the utility function linearly.  This incorporates
the concept of Hansen (1985) in which an employment lottery is used to linearize the
utility effect of employment.
The representative consumer faces the budget constraint, presented in real terms,
given in equation 2:
                                                
3 The variables with no script denote period t, the ones with a superscript denote the following period;
t+1.
9p
TR
p
mkrhwn
p
micc ++⋅+⋅≤τ⋅+′+++ 21                                                          (2)
The consumer receives labor income expressed as the wage rate multiplied by
hours worked, hw ⋅ , and rental income on capital, kr ⋅ , where r is the rental rate and
k is the stock of capital.  Real money balances, 
p
m , were selected in the previous
period and these are augmented by the lump sum transfer of new money added to the
system, 
p
TR .  The assets listed on the right hand side of equation 2 are divided among
the following uses:  consumption of the cash good, c1 , and credit good, c2 ,
investment into new capital, i, real money balances selected for the next period, 
p
m′ ,
and transactions costs, τ⋅n , where n is the number of transactions per data period
and τ is the cost per transaction.
The demand for money is motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint. In the
benchmark example new transfers are not available as liquidity. This is presented in
real terms in equation 3:
p
nm
c
⋅≤1       .                                                                                                        (3)
The innovation of the model is the introduction of the velocity variable, n,
representing the number of transactions per period, and the associated cost of
transacting is given by τ.  This brings in the contribution of Baumol-Tobin in which
the consumer jointly decides both the stock of money to carry and the frequency with
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which that stock is replenished.  If we set n = 1 and τ = 0 then the model is the same
as Lucas and Stokey (1987). This model is also utilized in Cooley and Hansen's
(1991) 'Inflation Tax Only' case.  The variable n is interpreted as the velocity of
money in the data period.  The velocity can take any non-negative value. The timing
used in equation 3 is the same as the timing of Svensson (1985) that is the supply of
money is not available before the next period. Although this timing convention
sometimes leads the CIA constraint to strictly bind in Svensson's model, the
innovation, n, relaxes the CIA constraint in this model. The case where the new
money supply is available used in the same period is also examined.
        The law of motion for the capital stock is: ( ) ikk +δ−=′ 1 .  There is an economy-
wide resource constraint which binds in equilibrium; the agent can not spend more
than the period output, it is either consumed, invested as physical capital, or used up
in a transaction: ynicc ≤⋅τ+++ 21 . In equilibrium, the resource constraint, budget
and CIA constraints will all hold with equality, because the consumption good is
always valued.
        To simplify the problem we introduce a transformation of variables:
           
M
mm =ˆ  and 
Mg
p
M
pp ⋅=′=ˆ
where m is representative consumer's money demand and M is the average money
supply, so mˆ  is the relative share of money held by the representative consumer.  In
equilibrium the consumer's share of money is one, 1ˆˆ ==′ mm . In a sense, relative
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money balance, mˆ , is the numerairé in this model which will be unity at equilibrium.
After the substitution of variables the utility function can be written:
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 


 τ⋅−′−′−δ−+⋅
−−−+⋅+⋅⋅
⋅= hn
p
mkk
gp
mngkrhw
gp
nmUhccU ,ˆ
ˆ
1
ˆ
ˆ11,
ˆ
ˆ
,, 21    .     (4)
2.4 Firm
The firm produces output according to a constant returns to scale, Cobb-Douglas
production function:
( ) HKHKFY θ−θ== 1,                                                                                           (5)
Since input markets are competitive, the wage is given by the marginal product of
labor:
   ( ) ( ) 

θ−=
θ
H
KHKW 1,            ,                                                                                 (6)
the rental rate of capital is:
   ( ) 

θ=
−θ
H
KHKR
1
,       .                                                                                         (7)
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Capital letters refer to variables outside of the representative consumer's control
and small letters refer to the consumer's choice variables.  In equilibrium all markets
clear, so IiKkHh === ,,  ect.
2.5 Value Function
The consumer's utility maximization problem can be represented as a value
function:
   ( ) ( ) ( ){ }mkvhccumkv
nmkh
′′+= ′′ ,,,max, 21,ˆ,, β                                                                  (8)
Since there is no uncertainty, it is not necessary to consider ( )mkv ′′,  as an
expectation. Each period the consumer selects the labor supplied, the amount of
capital stock to carry forward, the amount of money stock to carry forward, and the
number of transactions to undertake given the current income and real money
balances determined in the previous period.
2.6 First Order Conditions (FOC)
The first order conditions for the consumer's problem are:
( ) 01
0
2
2
2
=γ−α−=
=∂
∂+



∂
∂




∂
∂=
c
w
h
u
c
u
h
cvh
                                                                                  (9)
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0,11
0,,
2
2
2
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 −−=
=′′+



∂
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
′∂
∂=
′
′′
mkv
c
mkv
c
u
k
cmkv
k
kk
βα
β
                                                       (10a)
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We can use the envelope theorem to eliminate ( )mkvk ′′′ ,  and ( )mkvm ′′′ ,ˆ :
( ) 


 α−δ−+=



∂
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u
kk 22
2 11                                                                 (10b)



 α−




⋅
−−


 α




⋅=




∂
∂




∂
∂+



∂
∂




∂
∂=
cc
c
c
c
cv
gp
n
gp
n
u
m
u
mm
21
2
2
1
1
ˆ
1
ˆ
1
ˆ
ˆˆ
                                                                     (11b)
2.7 Combining the First Order Conditions
In this model the solution for the production decisions h, k′ and y is separate
from the consumption decision and is not effected by the money supply process. The
14
production component of the model has been included in our economy for easy
comparison with Cooley and Hansen(1991).
Equilibrium capital stock is found by iteration. Combining FOC we obtain
simple consumption rules:
( ) τα ⋅−−= niyc1
  and
 ( )( )iyc −α−= 12 .
Notice that consumption of credit good is invariant with respect to the number of
transactions, and therefore with respect to the inflation rate. This results from the
linear inclusion of labor in the utility function. When inflation increases consumer
tends to transact more to economize on his money holdings. Transactions costs
reduce the consumption of c1 so drives a wedge between the marginal utility of c1
and c2.
The price level and the velocity of money, n, are determined jointly by the
following two equations:


 +−β


⋅α
γ= −−
g
ng
W
p 11ˆ                                                                                        (12)
( )[ ] ( )τ
−α<<


τ⋅−−α= − iyn
g
nniyp 0,ˆ 1                                                                  (13)
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     Equation 12 shows a stationary equilibrium with respect to mˆ . In this equation pˆ
increases linearly in n. Equation 13 gives combinations of pˆ  and n which satisfy
resource constraints. Figure I shows graph of equation 12 and 13. In equation 12 we
restrict ourselves to stationary equilibrium and the graph shows that there is a unique
solution for n ≥ 0 and pˆ ≥ 0 and for g ≥ β. Equation 12 is linear, at n = 0 the slopes of
equations 12 and 13 are equal and the slope of equation 13 is increasing in n. Also,
( ) τα /iyn −= provides a vertical asymptote to equation 13. Hence, there is a unique
solution for g ≥ β. If g < β there is no solution with positive price.
Figure 1: Unique Solution when β≥g
( )g
W
m 11ˆ −− −


α
γ β
equation 13
n*
p*
p
equation 12
slope = 1/g
n( )
τ
−α
ˆ
iy
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3. CALIBRATION AND NUMERICAL SOLUTION
3.1 Calibration
All parameters of the model, except for τ, are chosen to be the same as
Cooley and Hansen (1991) for comparison purposes. The share of capital in total
output, θ, is 0,36. The quarterly depreciation rate, δ, is set to be 0,02. The discount
factor, β, is equated to 0,99 where annual real inflation rate is 4 percent. The
coefficient of labor supplied in the utility function, γ, is 1,8 and α, the relative
importance of cash and credit good in the utility function, is 0,844.
We calibrate the transactions cost τ so that the model replicates U.S. money
velocity for the observation period using the money growth rate, g, which matches
the observed inflation rate.
Considering the recent technological innovations in money sector, we
adopted quarterly data from 1981,1 to 2000,4 on real GDP, money stock,
consumption, capital stock, and the CPI for our calculations. The inflation rate
between the specified periods is found to be % 0,8 using CPI data.
                                                
4 The selection procedure of the parameters is described in detail in Cooley and Hansen (1991)
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Monthly money supply (not seasonally adjusted) data aggregated in to
quarters is used. The average quarterly M1 and M2 velocity for U.S. in the specified
period is found to be 1,78 and 0,47, respectively. In our model this velocity is
interpreted as the number of transactions conducted by the consumer, n, for U.S. in
the past 20 years period. We find that τ is 0.0068 for M1 and 0.0951 for M2.
3.2 Numerical Solution
Since the model can not be solved analytically, we solved it numerically by
using Gauss program. The only variable is the inflation rate. By changing the annual
inflation rate we examine the change in consumption, velocity, prices, seigniorage
revenue and transactions cost.
18
4. FRIEDMAN RULE
Money as a medium of exchange satisfies the double coincidence of wants
and makes transacting easier. Though it is essential for carrying out some
transactions, money can be costly to hold. While many other sorts of investment
vehicles pay interest, most forms of money, such as currency, pay little or no interest.
In order to decide how much money to hold, consumers must balance the costs of the
foregone interest payment with the saved transaction cost.
Milton Friedman (1969) described the optimal inflation rate as one that does
not penalize the consumer for holding money that pays no interest. This would
require a zero nominal interest rate. Using Fisher’s relationship between nominal and
real interest rates; ( ) ( )( )π++=+ 111 ri , we can see that, the real return on money
must be the negative of the inflation rate ( ) ( ) 111 −+=+ πr .
In our model the money growth rate, g, is also the inflation rate as there is no
real output growth. The Friedman Rule, g = β, is used as a benchmark for utility loss
due to inflation. When g=β the nominal interest rate is zero and the consumer is
indifferent to holding money. As g approaches β from above, n goes to zero. Utility
is maximized when g = β. At this point, there is no loss of resources due to
transactions costs and there is no misallocation of resources due to friction and note
that when g =β, n = pˆ  = 0 so there is no monetary equilibrium. The standard
19
measure of welfare losses associated with inflation is computed. The welfare cost is
measured by x in equation 14 where U* is the utility under Friedman Money Growth
Rule. Here, x is the proportion increase in goods c1 + c2  required to restore utility
lost due to inflation. This is the method employed by Cooley and Hansen (1991).
U* = α log [ c1 (1+x)] + (1-α) log [c2 (1+x)] - γ h                                      (14)
We find that x is strictly increasing in g. Inflation reduces utility.
  We compute ( ) yccxC /21 +=∆ , where C∆  is the total change in
consumption required to make the consumer as well off as under the Pareto optimal
allocation as a percentage of GDP. Column A in Table 1 and Table 2 gives values of
x for M1 and M2 respectively and column B gives ∆C.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 graph the relationship between x and inflation rate.
Figure 2 is for the M1 calibrated model and Figure 3 is for the M2 calibrated model.
In the both figures the marginal cost of inflation is very high in low inflation rates.
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Figure 2: Welfare Loss of Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M1 Data)
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Figure 3: Welfare Loss of Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M2 Data)
21
5. RESULTS
We numerically solve the calibrated model and analyze the effects of
different annual inflation rates on price levels, seigniorage revenue, transactions cost
and the velocity of money. The results for M1 data are presented in Table1 and the
results for M2 are presented in Table2.
5.1. Velocity
A major result of this paper is the fact that the velocity of money, defined as
the number of transactions per data period, n, is not forced to be either unity, or less
than or greater than unity. When the consumer economizes on his cash holdings he
can change the number of transactions he will encounter. In the model, velocity of
money increases with inflation, which is consistent with Baumol-Tobin's predictions.
Due to the calibration, our model is able to exactly match the average M1 and M2
velocities to U.S. data. Observe that in Table 2 the M2 velocity takes values which
are both below and above unity, depending on the inflation rate. This result has not
been achieved before as the previous models always restricted the velocity of money
as discussed in section 1.
At low rates of inflation, the marginal impact of inflation is very powerful on
velocity, seigniorage revenue, price level and transactions cost. For those inflation
rates, the consumer sharply increases his number of transactions to be able to reduce
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his cash holdings. For higher rates of inflation the number of transactions continues
to increase but the response to the inflation change is not so rapid.
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Figure 4: Change in Velocity With Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M1 Data)
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Figure 5: Change in Velocity With Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M2 Data)
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5.2 The Seigniorage
The government can finance its spending in three ways; apply direct taxes,
borrow from public, or print money. Although, seigniorage, the government revenue
raised by creating money, is a relatively cheap way of financing, it also results in
social costs. When government finances its spending with the new issued money, it
increases the money supply. Money growth leads the consumers to expect inflation at
the rate of money growth. Inflation raises the opportunity cost of holding money.
Consumers tend to economize on their money holdings. In equilibrium, the price
level will be higher and the transactions will lead to a friction, which drives a wedge
between marginal utilities of consumption of c1 and c2, cash and credit good,
respectively.
Inflation transfers the purchasing power from the consumer to the
government. Hence, seigniorage resulting in inflation works as a tax on money
holdings. As a quantitative literature states seigniorage revenue alone can not be
sufficient enough to cover government spending5. Imrohoroglu and Prescott (1991)
and Haslag (1998) emphasize this as:
        “   ..if government were to make purchases; if  it has to cover its spendings,
        seigniorage tax is not a good one relative to a tax on labor income.”
        “For the most countries, money creation accounts for less than 2 percent of real
         GDP. The evidence indicates that seigniorage revenue is not the primary
                                                
5  For the discriptions I have benefited from the FRBSF Economic Letters of Marquis(2001) and
Cogley(1997).
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         source of revenue for a government, but neither is it quantitatively
         insignificant.”
In our model, the government does not make any purchases. Seigniorage
revenue is transferred to the consumer in lump sums. By printing money the
government lowers the value of pre-existing money. We have examined two timing
conventions. In the first one the newly issued money is not available as cash for
spending in the same period, in the second one this money is available to spend in the
same period.
Seigniorage, as a tax on holding money, has direct and indirect effects on
welfare. The transactions cost will effect the consumer directly by reducing resources
available for other ends. Seigniorage also drives a wedge between the marginal
utilities of the cash and credit goods.
The seigniorage revenue raised is shown in Figure III and Figure IV for M1
and M2 data respectively. The marginal seigniorage revenue when annual inflation
rate is low is very high when compared with higher rates of inflation.
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Figure 6: Seigniorage Revenue As a Function of Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit
M1 Data)
Seigniorage revenue(M2)
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Figure 7: Seigniorage Revenue As a Function of Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit
M2 Data)
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5.3 The Transactions Cost
As in Baumol-Tobin, the inflationary environment increases transacting and
therefore transactions costs. Inflation can divert the resources allocated for
consumption to the payment systems. When facing higher inflation, consumers
economize on their money holdings. As inflation rises, a bigger percentage of the
economy’s resources go into transacting in such ways so less will be available for
production, thus reducing output and consumption and lowering welfare. The C
column in Table 1 reflects the results of transactions cost, τ * n, as a percentage of
GDP.
As the inflation rate increases, the transactions cost increases and the welfare
declines. The decrease in welfare has two interpretations; (1) resources are lost when
transacting and (2) transacting drives a wedge between the marginal utilities of c1
and c2. In higher rates of inflation, the wedge between consuming cash and credit
good gets bigger. It appears from our results that the predominant cost of inflation is
the transactions cost as opposed to the reallocation of goods between c1 and c2.
Looking to Table 1 it is clear that B and C columns, the welfare cost and the
transactions cost, respectively, are pretty similar. Only with very high inflation rates,
we find that the values in column B are slightly bigger than those in column C. This
reflects the additional welfare loss due to the fact that the transactions cost affect
only one good.
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Figure 8: Transactions Costs With Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M1 Data)
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Figure 9: Transactions Costs With Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M2 Data)
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5.4 Does Timing Matter?
We also checked to see whether the timing of the transfer payment matters
for the consumer when giving his consumption decisions. When the transfer payment
is added to equation (3), the consumer will have the opportunity to use the transfer in
the same period not only for the credit good but also for the cash good. The results
with this set up are summarized in Table 3 with M1 calibrated data and in Table 4
with M2 calibrated data.
The results show that timing of transfer payments matters.  Figures from 10
to 17 depicts the graphs of welfare cost of inflation, velocity of money, seigniorage
revenue and transactions costs with this timing change and with M1 and M2
calibrated models. Under this timing convention, as inflation rises, the velocity of
money converges to one. In the case of the M1 calibrated model, the convergence is
from above one so transactions are predicted to fall as inflation rises. Therefore, the
welfare loss due to inflation decreases in higher inflation rates. With the M2
calibrated model, the velocity converges to one from below so the welfare cost is
increasing in inflation again. This timing convention is unattractive because it
implicitly makes the data period important for the consumer. Each data period the
consumer receives a transfer, 
p
TR . This can not be converted into an interest bearing
asset. As inflation rises, the transfer rises. At high rates of inflation the transfer alone
will satisfy liquidity needs, n = 1. Here the length of time between transfers, the
exogenously fixed data collection period, is important to the consumer. Under the
timing rule of the benchmark case presented in section 2 the consumer is indifferent
the data period length.
29
M1
0,000000
0,000500
0,001000
0,001500
0,002000
0,002500
0,003000
0,003500
-50% 0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300%
Annual Inflation Rate
x
Figure 10: Welfare Loss of Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M1 Data)
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Figure 11: Welfare Loss of Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M2 Data)
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Figure 12: Change in Velocity With Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M1 Data)
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Figure 13: Change in Velocity With Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M2 Data)
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Seigniorage revenue(M1)
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Figure 14: Change in Seigniorage Revenue With Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit
M1 Data)
 Seigniorage revenue(M2)
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Figure 15: Change in Seigniorage Revenue With Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit
M2 Data)
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Transactions Cost(M1)
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Figure 16: Transactions Costs With Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M1 Data)
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Figure 17: Transactions Costs With Inflation (Model Calibrated to Fit M2 Data)
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6. CONCLUSION
Fifty years after its introduction, the Baumol-Tobin model is still the textbook
explanation for the relationship between inflation and the velocity of money. CIA
models, the most common tool for including money in a general equilibrium money
of economy, have not yet fully incorporated the Baumol-Tobin concept. We show
that the inclusion is simple to accomplish and yields straightforward results. It
becomes clear in our model that velocity, real balances, and price level are
inseparably linked.
Money growth provides a government with seigniorage at the cost of lost
efficiency. We show that the efficiency loss has two components. First it requires the
economy to devote more resources to the transactions technology. Second, it causes a
misallocation of resources away from cash good. Cooley and Hansen were only able
to incorporate the second of these effects into their model.
We are able to capture the Cagan effect, which is weak in previous CIA
models. As inflation increases, individuals transact more often and economize on
cash balances. In equilibrium this leads to an increase in the equilibrium price.
There are numerous possible applications of this model. We should see if the
model captures the second moments in a stochastic setting. We can empirically
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investigate the cross sectional relationship between inflation rates and transactions
costs. We can investigate the effect on exchange rates of differential money growth
rates. The innovation added one variable and one parameter so it can easily be added
to any existing CIA model of money demand.
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Table 1: The Results With M1 Data.
1 welfare cost consumption (%)
2 welfare cost % GNP
3 transactions cost / GNP ( )τn
4 seigniorage / GNP
Table 2: The Results With M2 Data.
1 welfare cost consumption (%)
2 welfare cost % GNP
3 transactions cost / GNP ( )τn
4 seigniorage / GNP
π n p c1 Utility A1 B2 C3 D4
0.0 1.3334 1.1139 1.1970 -0.9254 0.0063 0.0048 0.0048 0.0000
0.05 1.9864 1.6453 1.1926 -0.9285 0.0095 0.0071 0.0071 0.0039
0.10 2.4550 2.0154 1.1894 -0.9307 0.0117 0.0088 0.0088 0.0061
0.20 3.1569 2.5460 1.1846 -0.9341 0.0151 0.0113 0.0113 0.0092
0.50 4.5137 3.4697 1.1754 -0.9407 0.0218 0.0162 0.0162 0.0147
0.75 5.2766 3.9201 1.1702 -0.9444 0.0256 0.0190 0.0190 0.0176
1.00 5.8744 4.2357 1.1662 -0.9473 0.0286 0.0212 0.0211 0.0199
1.50 6.7883 4.6539 1.1599 -0.9518 0.0333 0.0245 0.0244 0.0233
2.00 7.4805 4.9199 1.1552 -0.9552 0.0368 0.0270 0.0269 0.0258
3.00 8.5065 5.2381 1.1483 -0.9603 0.0421 0.0307 0.0306 0.0296
4.00 9.2635 5.4190 1.1431 -0.9641 0.0460 0.0335 0.0333 0.0323
π n p c1 Utility A1 B2 C3 D4
0.0 0.3525 0.3007 1.1725 -0.9428 0.0240 0.0178 0.0177 0.0000
0.05 0.5225 0.4464 1.1563 -0.9544 0.0360 0.0264 0.0263 0.0143
0.10 0.6434 0.5488 1.1448 -0.9629 0.0447 0.0326 0.0324 0.0227
0.20 0.8229 0.6971 1.1277 -0.9755 0.0580 0.0417 0.0415 0.0338
0.50 1.1640 0.9603 1.0952 -1.0001 0.0843 0.0592 0.0587 0.0531
0.75 1.3525 1.0915 1.0773 -1.0139 0.0995 0.0689 0.0682 0.0633
1.00 1.4986 1.1850 1.0633 -1.0249 0.1116 0.0764 0.0756 0.0711
1.50 1.7191 1.3116 1.0423 -1.0416 0.1304 0.0879 0.0867 0.0827
2.00 1.8839 1.3943 1.0266 -1.0544 0.1449 0.0964 0.0951 0.0912
3.00 2.1247 1.4968 1.0037 -1.0734 0.1668 0.1090 0.1072 0.1036
4.00 2.2997 1.5580 0.9870 -1.0874 0.1833 0.1182 0.1160 0.1126
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Table 3: The Results With M1 Data With Timing Difference.
1 welfare cost consumption (%)
2 welfare cost % GNP
3 transactions cost / GNP ( )τn
4 seigniorage / GNP
Table 4: The Results With M2 Data With Timing Difference.
1 welfare cost consumption (%)
2 welfare cost % GNP
3 transactions cost / GNP ( )τn
4 seigniorage / GNP
π n p c1 Utility A1 B2 C3 D4
0.0 2.8449 2.3670 1.2018 -0.9220 0.0029 0.0022 0.0022 0.0000
0.05 1.5774 1.3103 1.2037 -0.9207 0.0016 0.0012 0.0012 0.0049
0.10 1.3347 1.1084 1.2041 -0.9204 0.0013 0.0010 0.0010 0.0112
0.20 1.1872 0.9858 1.2043 -0.9203 0.0012 0.0009 0.0009 0.0239
0.50 1.0894 0.9044 1.2045 -0.9202 0.0011 0.0008 0.0008 0.0564
0.75 1.0665 0.8854 1.2045 -0.9202 0.0011 0.0008 0.0008 0.0781
1.00 1.0547 0.8756 1.2045 -0.9201 0.0011 0.0008 0.0008 0.0962
1.50 1.0427 0.8656 1.2045 -0.9201 0.0010 0.0008 0.0008 0.1253
2.00 1.0364 0.8604 1.2046 -0.9201 0.0010 0.0008 0.0008 0.1478
3.00 1.0299 0.8550 1.2046 -0.9201 0.0010 0.0008 0.0008 0.1815
4.00 1.0265 0.8521 1.2046 -0.9201 0.0010 0.0008 0.0008 0.2059
π n P c1 Utility A1 B2 C3 D4
0.0 0.3966 0.3372 1.1762 -0.9402 0.0213 0.0159 0.0158 0.0000
0.05 0.5001 0.4280 1.1684 -0.9458 0.0270 0.0200 0.0200 0.0150
0.10 0.5612 0.4822 1.1637 -0.9491 0.0304 0.0225 0.0224 0.0258
0.20 0.6356 0.5488 1.1581 -0.9531 0.0346 0.0255 0.0254 0.0430
0.50 0.7360 0.6396 1.1505 -0.9587 0.0404 0.0295 0.0294 0.0798
0.75 0.7748 0.6751 1.1476 -0.9608 0.0426 0.0311 0.0309 0.1024
1.00 0.7990 0.6973 1.1458 -0.9621 0.0440 0.0321 0.0319 0.1208
1.50 0.8281 0.7241 1.1436 -0.9638 0.0457 0.0332 0.0331 0.1497
2.00 0.8453 0.7400 1.1423 -0.9647 0.0467 0.0339 0.0338 0.1719
3.00 0.8653 0.7584 1.1408 -0.9658 0.0478 0.0347 0.0346 0.2046
4.00 0.8767 0.7691 1.1399 -0.9665 0.0485 0.0352 0.0350 0.2281
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